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Abstract  
Research on police integrity has focused to a large extent on the assessment of 
the seriousness of various forms of police misconduct. Employing vignettes 
cases it has been shown that police officers identify clear differences among 
forms of misconduct and these differences largely hold across countries and 
contexts. Moreover, the impact of a range of individual and organizational 
characteristics on the assessment of misbehavior has been established. This 
chapter analyzes the impact of perceptions of the institutional environment and 
police effectiveness among Ugandan police officers to assess the external 
validity of the assessments of the seriousness of misconduct presented in the 
vignettes. The research focuses on ten aspects of police officers’ perceptions of 
the institutional environment and police effectiveness and shows that the 
perceptions are strongly interrelated and that they impact on attitudes towards 
police integrity.  Thus, while the vignettes are meant as a tool to reduce 
subjective biases in the evaluation of police misbehavior, the assessment of the 
vignettes is not free of individual perceptions. This suggests that the vignettes 
can be seen as means to channel and represent the individual subjective biases 
in a coherent and comparable form. 
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Introduction 
As a key element of the ‘strong arm’ of the state, the police have generally been the subject of 
much academic research. The police face the so-called ‘paradox of violence’ of the 
democratic state: the police (next to the army) claim the monopoly on the legitimate use of 
violence, but also need to respect legal restraints on the actual use of its powers. As argued by 
Gary Marx (2001), ‘a democratic society needs protection both by police and from police’. 
Given the role of police in society, the integrity of police officers is very important. 
Moreover, identification of the factors that promote police integrity and those that hinder it 
has considerable societal relevance. 
 Research on police integrity has grown substantially over the past two decades (see the 
overview of publications in Kutnjak Ivković, 2015: 18-30). The academic literature in this 
field received a major boost with the seminal work of Klockars et al. (2000), who developed a 
method for the measurement of police integrity built on hypothetical cases (vignettes) rather 
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than attempts to ask police officers direct questions about their behavior. The advantage of the 
approach is that it reduces bias since the vignettes do not directly inquire about own behavior 
but ask for the assessment of the hypothetical behavior depicted in the cases. Moreover, the 
vignettes allow the presentation of a set of uniform cases to all study participants independent 
of their experience and (socio-economic) background. This method was underpinned by the 
so-called organizational theory of police integrity, consisting of four dimensions: 
organizational rules, techniques of controlling police misconduct, the police agencies’ efforts 
of curtailing the ‘code of silence’ in the police force, and the influence of the social and 
political environment on the police force (Kutnjak Ivković, 2015: 5-11). 
Previous studies have mainly focused on the internal validation of the vignette 
approach to police integrity. First, studies have demonstrated that more severe cases are 
judged more severely (e.g., Jenks et al., 2014: 330). Second, the vignettes have shown to be 
applicable across countries and contexts, subject to minor context-specific adjustments, thus 
yielding coherent results (Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld, 2015: 334)  
In order to add to the existing body of work evolving to a large extent around the 
internal consistency of the vignette approach, this chapter aims to assess the external validity 
of the vignettes. Thus, we link evaluative questions about the vignettes to the perceived 
institutional environment and perceptions of police effectiveness and assess to what extent 
they are related. We consider the police officers’ own perceptions of the situation and the 
work of the police as prime candidates for such an analysis.  
This chapter uses questions about the perceptions of the institutional environment and 
police effectiveness among Ugandan police officers to contextualize the findings on police 
integrity measured by the vignettes. We have identified ten elements of the perceived 
institutional environment (e.g., similar treatment by age, gender, and socio-economic status; 
level of crime in the community) and police effectiveness (e.g., confidence in own and 
colleagues’ work) and analyze the relationship of these elements with the evaluative 
responses to the vignette cases. Our data, collected in 2015 in an attempt to evaluate a police 
reform project (see, e.g., Hout et al., 2016: 51-75), expressly contained questions about the 
wider environment of the Ugandan police force, as well as police officers’ own assessments 
of their work situation and perceptions of the operations and effectiveness of the police 
organization. Thus, our research attempts to contribute to research in the tradition of the 
organizational approach to police integrity by focusing mainly on how police officers’ 
perceptions of their institutional environment may impact on their position on various forms 
of police misconduct. 
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Next to adding to insights about the external validity of the vignettes, we make a 
methodological contribution to the literature on police integrity. While it is relevant to assess 
the hypothetical cases one by one and compare the assessments of police officers, we feel it is 
equally valuable to pool the outcomes and look at patterns underlying the ensemble of 
vignettes to contribute to a deeper understanding of the usefulness of vignettes.  
 
Police integrity and perceptions of the police force 
Research in the field of governance has led to the definition of integrity as ‘the quality of 
acting in accordance with relevant moral values, norms, and rules’ (Lasthuizen et al., 2011: 
387), where integrity can be a quality both of individuals and organizations. Police integrity is 
commonly understood as ‘the normative inclination among police to resist temptations to 
abuse the rights and privileges of their occupation’ (Klockars et al., 2006: 1). 
The literature on police integrity has hitherto focused mostly on the impact of various 
(socio-economic and experience-related) characteristics of police officers and the 
infrastructure and overall situation of the police agencies on the perceptions of seriousness of 
police misconduct and the perceptions of fellow officers’ willingness to report (Kutnjak 
Ivković, 2015: 18-27). Research focusing on perceptions of the institutional environment in 
the police force has remained surprisingly scarce, although it is not difficult to argue that the 
way in which police officers perceive their environment may have an impact toward their 
attitudes on misconduct and their willingness to report acts of misconduct.  
Several studies have demonstrated how differences at the macro-societal level impact 
on police officers’ attitudes to corruption, the treatment of prisoners, and other forms of 
misconduct. For instance, Kutnjak Ivković et al. (2016) report on research among the police 
in Croatia and show that features of society at large seem to play a role in officers’ assessment 
of police misbehavior, although the impact of such community characteristics is limited by 
variations in organizational features of the police.  Further, a study on police integrity in 
Russia finds a clear impact of the overall societal perception of corruption. The authors of that 
study (Cheloukine et al., 2015: 179) conclude as follows: 
 
In the environment in which corruption is entrenched into everyday life 
and everything is for sale, the acceptance of kickbacks … and thefts from 
the crime scene … are the new ‘normal.’ In the situation in which planting 
of evidence on innocent people and falsification of official records to bust 
the arrest records are occurring on a regular basis, falsification of a police 
record … and a failure to exercise an arrest warrant on a friend … are also 
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becoming the new ‘normal.’  
 
Comparative studies on police integrity corroborate the impact of the institutional 
environment and, in particular, of the social perception of corruption (e.g., Andreescu et al., 
2012: 198-199; Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld, 2015). Further, comparative research on the 
treatment of suspect behavior and the use of force indicates how the culture of a police force 
seems to impact on the attitudes of police officers toward the use of force (Waddington et al., 
2009: 134-135). Finally, a team of French researchers demonstrated how the ‘professional 
ideologies’ of police officers (expressed in the three main positions that police activity should 
be mainly repressive or preventive or a combination of both) are impacting on their opinions 
on the role of the police (Coulangeon et al., 2012). 
Relatively little research has so far been done on the perceptions of police officers 
regarding the police force and on how these perceptions affect police officers’ attitudes 
toward misconduct and their willingness to report misconduct. Various studies have addressed 
the impact of the organizational culture and the code of silence on the perceptions of police 
officers about police integrity (e.g. Kucukuysal, 2008; Kutnjak Ivković and Sauerman, 2015), 
while others have analyzed the impact of different disciplinary environments on perceived 
disciplinary consequences of misconduct (e.g., Lee et al., 2013; Kutnjak Ivković and 
Khechumyan, 2014; Cheloukine et al., 2015; Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2016; Kuo, 2018). 
Further, a number of studies have focused on the impact of perceptions of disciplinary 
fairness (i.e., how fair do officers feel that the disciplinary consequences of their behavior 
are?) on the likelihood that misconduct will be reported and the code of silence will be broken 
(e.g. Kutnjak Ivković and O’Connor Shelley, 2010; Long et al., 2013; Kutnjak Ivković and 
Sauerman, 2013; Porter et al., 2015). Wolfe and Piquero (2011) showed how different aspects 
of perceived organizational justice – broken down into distributive, procedural and 
interactional aspects – influence the incidence of police misconduct. Using a slightly different 
approach, Myhill and Bradford (2013) demonstrated how perceptions of organizational justice 
impact positively on police attitudes to serving the public. Finally, a study by Bucak (2012) 
has shown that police cynicism (understood as the pessimistic outlook of police officers 
towards their job) has an impact, albeit moderately, on police integrity. 
The lack of attention to perceptions of police officers on the functioning of the police 
force, and particularly its effectiveness, has motivated the current study. We feel that a more 
profound analysis of police officers’ perceptions of the effectiveness of their own work and its 
possible relationship with police integrity would contribute to a better understanding of the 
  
5 
influence of the social and political environment on the police force (the fourth dimension 
highlighted in the organizational theory of police integrity). In a similar vein as Bucak (2012: 
44-49) we start from the hypothesis that the way in which police officers appreciate their 
work, and in particular the degree to which they believe that their work contributes to social 
values, impacts on the way they perform their duties. Thus, the perception of one’s own work 
as being ineffective may lead to the acceptance of corruption and other forms of misconduct 
on the part of the police. 
 
The Uganda National Police 
Before moving on to our empirical analysis we present some background information about 
Uganda and its police force. Since 1986, Ugandan politics has been dominated by President 
Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM), the political successor to the 
National Resistance Army (NRA), which prevailed in the Ugandan Bush War, the protracted 
civil war against the regime of Milton Obote (1980-1985). The Ugandan ‘Movement System’, 
which existed from 1986 until 2005, was envisaged to be a non-party political system, where 
representatives were elected on individual rather than party platforms. Museveni won the first 
Ugandan presidential elections in 1996 and was re-elected to the presidency in four 
subsequent national elections (2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016). Although Uganda has had multi-
party elections since the mid-2000s, Museveni’s regime has become increasingly 
authoritarian. Regime maintenance became an important objective, and this led to the search 
for instruments to broaden the regime’s support base among the Ugandan population (Khisa, 
2014).  
Increased opposition led the Museveni regime to mobilize political support for the 
NRM by using patronage-driven appointments and tolerating corruption, the rising costs of 
which have been labeled ‘inflationary patronage’ (Khisa, 2014: 32-36; Barkan, 2011; cf. 
Tangri and Mwenda, 2013). Decentralization has been an important instrument of patronage; 
the increase of the number of districts from around 40 in the mid-1990s to 111 since 2012 
(Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives, 2017) served as a means for the regime to 
appoint its supporters to local government positions (Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2013: 16-
17). Further, the NRM government became increasingly repressive, targeting independent 
media, the judiciary and opposition parties (Anderson and Fisher, 2016). In recent decades, 
the Uganda National Police and the national army have been important instruments of the 
regime’s attempts to maintain power. A former army commander, Major-General Mugisha 
Muntu, and current opponent of the Museveni regime, characterized the Uganda National 
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Police recently as ‘an extension of the ruling party’ (Economist, 2018). 
The Ugandan police force was institutionalized in 1906 (Uganda Police Force, 2007) 
and has officially been known as ‘Uganda National Police’ since April 2014 (Lumu, 2014). It 
is divided functionally into 20 directorates based on tasks and geographically into regional 
and district offices, police stations and posts (Uganda Police, 2015). Data about the police and 
policing activities is scant since the statistical capacity of the police is weak (Uganda Police 
Force, 2007). In the early 2000s, Uganda had fewer than 15,000 police officers, with 
considerable year-to-year variation according to the available statistics (Commonwealth 
Human Rights Initiative, 2006a: 26-27). In 2007, the Ugandan police force experienced a 
major increase of personnel – it went from approximately 27,000 to 48,000 officers – and saw 
the creation of more directorates in preparation for the Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting (Xinhua News Agency, 2007). At the end of 2014, the Inspector General announced 
an increase of the police from roughly 40,000 to 65,000 officers (Kakamwa, 2014).  
Concerning crime statistics and the security environment in Uganda, 252,065 crimes 
were reported in 2017, resulting in a crime rate involving 667 victims per 100,000 Ugandans 
(Uganda Police, 2017: 2). Public sector crime investigations have been declining over a range 
of years. The Ugandan police reported 37 cases of corruption in 2017, compared to 194 in 
2016 and 413 in 2013 (Uganda Police, 2013: 9; Uganda Police, 2017: 8). Background 
information on the types of public sector corruption are not provided leaving it open whether 
corruption within the police is also included in these figures. The 2013 Crime Report 
indicated 19 cases in which police officers were under investigation of suspected crimes 
(Uganda Police, 2013). 
Uganda is in the top quintile of the most corrupt countries according to the 2018 
Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2018) and the Ugandan police is 
regarded as particularly corrupt (Wambua, 2015; Basheka, 2013: 72-74; Transparency 
International-Kenya, 2013). Results of various surveys – including Uganda’s National Service 
Delivery Study 2015 (Kato, 2016) and older surveys carried out by the Commonwealth 
Human Rights Initiative (2006b) between 1998 and 2005 – indicate that a majority of 
Ugandan citizens have consistently rated the police as the most corrupt institution in the 
country. 
The characteristics of corruption and fraud in Uganda, and the perception of 
corruption within the Ugandan national police, make the country an interesting case to study 
police integrity in relation to the extent to which police officers themselves perceive their 
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work as effective. We expect that, in particular, the high-corruption context of Uganda may 
reveal challenges to integrity and professionalism among the police. 
 
Survey set up, sampling, and questionnaire 
Our data are derived from interviews with police officers from 10 of the 143 Ugandan police 
districts (Uganda Police, 2017: e, f). The survey districts are Bushenyi, Iganga, Jinja, Kabale, 
Kabarole, Tororo, Luwero, Mbarara, Mityana, and Soroti. On purpose, no single Northern 
Ugandan district was sampled because of the impact of the conflict between the Ugandan 
government and the Lord’s Resistance Army rebels on the region. We employed the vignette 
cases along with questions about the perception of police work among 600 police officers in 
the 10 selected districts, sampling 60 officers within each district. The data collection was 
carried out by our local university partner, the Uganda Management Institute. The research 
team worked in close collaboration with the police. After authorization from the police 
headquarters, the local research team wrote a letter to the regional police officers informing 
them about the activities and asking for support. The research team then identified the study 
participants together with the police. The district-level sampling strategy was well respected 
with only some very minor deviations: in two districts only 59 officers could be interviewed, 
while in another two districts 61 officers were interviewed. Thus, the target sample of a total 
of 600 individuals was reached since officers that could not participate were replaced. 
We organized the survey in groups of 30 officers. Survey activities took place at the 
local level. To this end we rented venues that where equipped with enough tables and chairs 
for 30 police officers. To reach the target number of 60 officers per district, at least two 
survey sessions took place in every district, one in the morning and one in the afternoon of the 
scheduled survey days. 
 In an introduction, the enumerators presented the survey to the participating police 
officers and allowed for questions. The survey was conducted in English since English is one 
of the two official languages in Uganda and widely spoken in public services and government. 
The survey consisted of a self-administered pen and paper questionnaire. Each police officer 
was provided enough personal space to ensure privacy and confidentiality. To further protect 
anonymity, we did not ask the officers to provide their names or addresses. All survey 
activities took place in April 2015. 
In terms of sampling, we aimed at the representation of officers across all levels of 
rank. To this end, individual officers were selected in a stratified way. First, we purposively 
invited regional-level officers to participate in the survey because of their leading position. 
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Second, we also purposively included the leading police officers of the district headquarters in 
the survey. Finally, we randomly sampled police stations within districts: Half the officers in 
our sample come from small stations (with up to 10 officers) and 70% of them from mid-sized 
stations (with up to 25 officers). We introduced random participation at the police station 
level by randomly picking the day of the survey resulting in local participation based on 
availability or presence. At the local level we do not expect any systematic selection of 
participants into our sample since the police stations only have few officers. As motivated, we 
applied this sampling procedure to have a stratified sample of officers that represents the full 
spectrum of police work, functions, positions, and hierarchies.  
The survey among police officers had two parts. In the first part, officers reported their 
basic socio-economic characteristics together with information about their work experience 
and some basic facts about the staffing and equipment of their police station. In the second 
and core part, officers were asked to review twelve vignette cases and questions about the 
perceived institutional environment and effectiveness of the police. The vignettes were 
adapted to the Ugandan context based on the earlier versions developed by Klockars et al. 
(2000, 2006) and Kutnjak Ivković (2005a, 2005b). Adaptation to the local context was 
necessary since, for example, the offering of small gifts on holidays such as Christmas is not 
perceived as an indication of corruption. Furthermore, we wanted to test to what extent the 
police complaint form, introduced by the Ugandan police prior to our survey, was accepted 
among the police. Therefore, we included a case about the application of the form. Similarly, 
the peaceful monitoring of demonstrations and the professional clearing of potential conflicts, 
while accepting the right to demonstrate, was another aspect of policing that we considered 
necessary assessing in the specific Ugandan context.  The complaint form as well as the 
monitoring of demonstrations were topics that were perceived as very relevant by the locals. 
Thus, the cases that we deployed were co-developed with our local research partner, pre-
tested with the police and adjusted to the local context. Importantly, on purpose we opted for 
the inclusion of case scenarios with cultural load. For example, the originally proposed case 
scenarios contain the case of a burglary in a jewelry shop (Klockars et al., 2000, 2006). Since 
jewelry shops are not common in local Uganda there would not have been any value in 
presenting such a scenario. Consequently, we introduced a burglary in a general merchandise 
shop. We specified the goods relative to locally know units and products in an attempt to 
contextualize and to ensure that the police officers responding to the case had a good sense of 
the stolen value. Similarly, we included the category “Reported severe crimes against 
individuals not followed up upon” since this was identified by civil society organizations as a 
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major problem in Uganda. Thus, we were taking a needs-based and context-specific approach 
when replacing existing and integrating new cases. We consider this the strength of our 
analysis since the vignettes are the result of an in-depth analysis of the local context and 
conditions prior to the implementation of the case scenarios at scale. 
We presented the vignette cases in random order to avoid an order by severity. For the 
sake of exposition in this chapter, we have grouped the cases into six categories of two cases 
each: the first group focuses on the code of conduct among police officers, the second on 
bribery, the third on theft, the fourth on the refusal to register a complaint against the police, 
the fifth on severe crimes against individuals that are not followed up by the police, and the 
sixth on undue force used by the police against suspects and demonstrators (table 1).  
 
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
The wording of the vignette cases can be found in Appendix 2. Note that we implemented the 
vignettes in the context of an impact assessment of the Police Accountability and Reform 
Project (for detailed results see Hout et al., 2016; Wagner et al., 2019; Hout et al. 2019). 
Moreover, the original wording of the vignette cases allowed for the random variation of the 
gender of the portrayed police officers, perpetrators, and victims. The related gender 
dynamics are assessed in a separate article (Wagner et al., 2017). We show there that neither 
the randomly varying gender of the police officer nor the randomly varying gender of the 
victim depicted in the vignette cases are related to the judgment of police malpractice, or to 
suggested disciplinary measures. What we do find is that male respondents tend to be stricter 
in their assessment of the hypothetical cases. Overall, the results show that gender perceptions 
do not differ between male and female police officers. Based on this finding, we do not expect 
that the survey experiment has any repercussions for the analysis at hand. Most importantly, 
since the gender variations were introduced randomly and balancing holds well across 
randomly introduced male and female gender attributes, we are methodologically on the safe 
side. 
In our survey we obtained comprehensive answers to five of the original seven 
evaluative questions introduced by Klockars et al. The police officers answered the following 
questions for each case: 




2. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this 
behavior? (Referred to as ‘Own reporting’) 
3. How serious do MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR OFFICE consider this 
behavior to be? (Referred to as ‘Colleagues’ seriousness’) 
4. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing 
so, what if any disciplinary measure do YOU think SHOULD follow? 
(Referred to as ‘Disciplinary measure that should follow’) 
5. Would this behavior be regarded as a violation of official policy in your 
agency?  (Referred to as‘Regarded as violation of official policy’) 
In line with the existing literature the possible answer categories range from 1 to 5 on a Likert 
scale. Responses to questions 1 and 3 had the answer categories ‘not at all serious’ [1] to 
‘very serious’ [5]. Questions 2 and 5 could be answered on a categorical scale from ‘definitely 
not’ [1] to ‘definitely yes’ [5].  Question 4 on disciplinary measures comprised six categories 
in ascending order of severity of the response: ‘none’ [1], ‘verbal reprimand’ [2], ‘written 
reprimand’ [3], ‘period of suspension without pay’ [4], ‘demotion in rank’ [5] and ‘dismissal’ 
[6].  
In addition, information about the officers’ perception of the institutional environment 
and police effectiveness was collected by using a set of ten Likert scale questions. The 
questions about the perceived institutional environment and police effectiveness include the 
following aspects: 
 
1. What is the perceived crime level in the local community? 
2. Do the police treat young people the same as older people? 
3. Do the police treat poor people the same as rich people? 
4. Do the police treat men the same as women? 
5. What is the level of confidence in the officer’s own work? 
6. What is the level of confidence in the work of the police in general? 
7. Do the police always have the duty to make people obey the law? 
8. Do the police perform a good job in treating people fairly and with respect? 
9. Do the police perform a good job in managing crime? 
10. Are the police corrupt? 
 
These questions were chosen because our survey was implemented in the context of Dutch 
policies and funding decisions focusing on rule of law and control of corruption initiatives in 
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Uganda. The multi-facetted aspects of good governance to reduce corruption were the guiding 
principles for Dutch financial involvement. The above ten questions were selected to capture 
good governance at the level of the police. On purpose we focused on aspects of the perceived 
institutional environment and police effectiveness. Our approach is in line with Miles-Johnson 
and Pickering (2018) who assess police recruits’ perceptions of trust in minority group 
members. Our first four questions are motivated by the idea that police officers evaluate their 
work relative to the broader community they live and work in and the different groups that 
constitute that community. In addition, question 1 is motivated by the finding that police 
officers have positive perceptions of their work when crime is reduced (Bradford et al., 2013). 
Questions 5 and 6 are motivated by the fact that by and large the existing literature assesses 
confidence and relatedly trust in the police (Balliet and Van Lange, 2013; Bradford, 2014; 
Mastrofski et al., 2016) but the aspect of own confidence receives less attention. We argue 
that police officers can only view their role as positive if next to the perception of the police 
by the public, the officers themselves have confidence in their work and the work of their 
colleagues. In addition, existing evidence shows that police officers perceive a sense of 
effectiveness when they are perceived as upholding the law (Jenks et al., 2012). This rational 
motives question 7. Questions 8 and 9 are meant to capture procedural fairness and justice, as 
well as policing that is equitable across all members of society (Miles-Johnson, 2016). 
Finally, question 10 asks for a self-assessment of the level of corruption at the police. Our 
approach is related to the work by Carr and Maxwell (2018) who assess officers’ perceptions 
of organizational justice on officer trust in the public. Similar to our research they employ 
multiple perception questions. Yet, their focus is different since they consider the relationship 
with the supervisor, as well as distributive and procedural justice within the police force. 
Individually and jointly our set of 10 questions allows us to assess perceptions of the 
institutional environment and effectiveness of the police. Thus, in our analysis we combine 
the information we have obtained from the vignette cases with the questions about perceived 
institutional environment and effectiveness to see how these perceptions affect police 
officers’ attitudes toward misconduct and their willingness to report such behavior.  
 
Descriptive statistics 
Background characteristics of the police officers and the districts 
Descriptive statistics of the background characteristics of the respondents and related to 




<Table 2 about here> 
 
The data on individual characteristics of the respondents provide an overview of the police 
officers included in our research. The average officer in the sample is almost 42 years old. 
Slightly less than a quarter of the respondents are female. Most of the officers are married 
(84%) and a similar percentage of the interviewees are head of a household (84%). They live 
in a household with, on average, almost 7 people. However, variation in household size is 
substantial (the standard deviation is 4). Almost half of the officers have completed secondary 
education, while 27% finished advanced secondary education and 25% have a higher 
education degree. Less than 3% have completed only primary education. Thus, our sample 
consists of prime-age individuals, who are predominately male and have a fairly high level of 
education relative to the overall population of Uganda. We control for all these aspects in the 
multivariate analysis to ensure that our findings are not influenced by variations in omitted 
background characteristics. 
In terms of economic well-being, we observed the following. Around 60% of the 
respondents earn between UGX 300,000 and 500,000 on a monthly basis.1 Another almost 
25% of the sample earn UGX 500,000 and more. The average respondent owns 1.34 mobile 
phones and has almost 2 habitable rooms at home. The inclusion of these economic variables 
in the analysis ensures that our results of interest are not influenced by differences in income 
that might be related to differences in perceptions.  
Sports activities are reported by 53% of the respondents and almost half of the 
respondents indicate being a member in a club or community organization. The latter two 
aspects serve as controls for the activity levels of the respondents and their readiness to 
actively engage in activities next to their work. We consider it necessary to control for these 
aspects since perceptions are linked to behavior not only at work but also in private life.  
Work-related characteristics are presented in Panel B of table 2. They form part of the 
second set of control variables. We collected information on the section of the police force the 
respondents are placed in, the length of their career as a police officer, and the infrastructure 
at their station (number of rooms, number of cars/motorcycles/bicycles). The average police 
officer has spent 18.8 years in service. Unsurprisingly, there is a considerable variation in this 
variable (the standard deviation is 10.5). The majority of the respondents, that is 46%, 
                                                        
1 This roughly corresponds to a range of US$ 80 and 135 based on the UGX/US$ exchange rate of 0.00027 from 
January 31st, 2019. According to World Bank (2019) data, per capita gross national income in Uganda was US$ 
50 per month in 2017. 
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perform general duties. Officers working in the investigation section make up 26% of the 
sample. The remaining officers work for other sections, including traffic police and 
intelligence departments. The police stations they are placed in vary greatly in size: on 
average they have 12.8 rooms but the standard deviation is 9.3. Police motorcycles are the 
most common means of transport for the officers. The average station has 6.8 motorcycles, 
while it also possesses 1.5 cars and 2.1 bicycles. 
Finally, Panel C of table 2 presents some district-level characteristics. We selected the 
600 respondents from 10 districts, while aiming to obtain pairs of two similar districts in the 
district selection. To assess the district socio-economic and crime related situation we 
collected district level administrative data for all 10 districts from the local administrations: 
The average district has roughly 420,000 inhabitants and grows at an annual rate of 2%, while 
about one-fifth of the population is living in poverty. The average Gini inequality index is 0.4 
(District level administrative data). The districts are ethnically fairly homogeneous, as is 
shown by the finding that more than 70% of the population at district level belong to the 
district’s main ethnic group. The number of police officers per 100,000 inhabitants is 133.2 
The crime rate is 338.2 and the homicide rate is 8.6 (District level administrative data). 
Similar to the individual-level characteristics we control for the district-level characteristics in 
the multivariate analysis to avoid that our results are biased as a consequence of differences 
across districts. 
 
Descriptive statistics of the outcome variables derived from the vignette cases 
The descriptive statistics of the five outcome variables that we collected for the twelve 
vignette cases are presented in table 3. This table presents the average for the five outcomes 
across all twelve cases, thus resulting from 7,200 observations (12 cases*600 police officers). 
A detailed, case-by-case assessment is presented in table A1 in Appendix 1. We present the 
simple averages resulting from the Likert scale answers.  
 
<Table 3 about here> 
 
                                                        
2 In comparison, the average EU country had about 318 police officers per 100,000 inhabitants in 2016. The EU 
member state with the lowest number of officers is Finland, which had 137 officers per 100,000 inhabitants in 
2016 (EuroStat, 2016). 
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We observe that the responses to all five questions range on average between 3.9 and 
4.4, which suggests that the depicted cases of misbehavior are taken seriously by the officers. 
We find the lowest average Likert rating (3.9) for the evaluative question about the 
disciplinary measure that should follow and the highest average rating (4.4) for the evaluative 
question whether the behavior is a violation of official policy.  Moreover, we observe that the 
officers think that they themselves consider the depicted cases of misconduct slightly more 
seriously compared to their colleagues (table 3).  
Concerning the detailed descriptive statistics per case, our findings are in line with 
observations of other researchers in the field (cf. Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld, 2015: 340-
346). We find that there is a sorting of assessments by case severity (see table A1 in Appendix 
1). The first two vignette cases, on police code of conduct, are judged rather mildly. 
Receiving holidays in exchange for repairing a supervisor’s car is assessed moderately 
negatively (the average score is 3.72), although officers tend to be generally aware that such 
behavior violates official policy (average score of 4.24), which they would report (average 
score of 4.06). The misbehavior described in the second case, related to covering a drunk 
colleague who caused an accident, is by and large seen as a light offense.  
Cases of bribery are depicted in the second group of vignettes. Case 3, on accepting 
gifts while on duty, receives the lowest Likert scores of all cases. All respondents score only 
slightly higher than the neutral position (a value of 3) when it comes to reporting a colleague. 
Case 4, related to the acceptance of bribes, is evaluated very critically, as indicated by the 
score of 4.4. Moreover, police officers tend to agree that this misbehavior should be subject to 
stringent disciplinary action (average score of 4.3). 
The third group of cases contains incidences of theft. Case 5 (the misappropriation of 
money from a lost wallet) and case 6 (illegal enrichment when investigating a burglary) are 
judged quite harshly with scores of 4.0 and 4.5, respectively, and a great majority of 
respondents indicate they would report such misbehavior of a colleague. Case 6 is the 
instance of misbehavior that would require the toughest disciplinary response in the view of 
the police officers: the average score on the disciplinary action scale is 5.1. 
Overall, the first six cases suggest that police officers have a clear idea about 
acceptable and non-acceptable police behavior: acceptance of bribes and theft are evaluated 
more critically than violations of the police force’s code of conduct. In most cases, officers 
see themselves as more critical of misbehavior than their colleagues. Responses to the 
question whether particular forms of misbehavior violate official policy indicate the existence 
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of a gap between formal rules and actual practices since on average they tend to receive the 
highest score within a case.  
The next two cases depict situations in which police officers refuse to register 
complaints. The refusal to register a complaint and the humiliation of the complainant (case 
7) is judged rather mildly (score of 3.6), but the arrest of a complainant on false grounds (case 
8) is considered unacceptable by the majority of officers (score of 4.0). This is in line with our 
expectations and shows the internal coherence of the vignette cases.  
Lastly, cases of reported severe crimes against individuals without adequate follow-up 
by the police (cases 9 and 10), and of the use of undue force (cases 11 and 12) are assessed 
seriously or very seriously. Case 9, which involves the refusal to register the mistreatment of 
a wife, is considered to be one of the most serious forms of police misbehavior (score of 4.3). 
Police officers agree that such misbehavior should be subject to strict disciplinary action 
(score of 4.0). Although the failure to follow up on a reported murder (case 10) is assessed as 
a serious form of misconduct (score of 3.9), police officers do not feel such behavior should 
be punished very severely (score of 2.7 on the disciplinary action scale). The two cases of 
undue police force are considered to be serious, as they are rated with a score of 3.9 (case 11) 
and 4.1 (case 12). In these instances, disciplinary action should be quite harsh, according to 
the average police officer, whose response leads to a score of 3.9 on the disciplinary action 
scale in both cases. 
 
Descriptive statistics of the perceived effectiveness of the police 
As initially motivated we want to study the vignette case assessments in relation to the 
perceived effectiveness of the police. To do so, we build on the ten Likert scale questions 
about the perceived institutional environment and police effectiveness that were introduced 
above in section 4. Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics related to the ten perception 
variables on the institutional environment and police effectiveness. All variables are measured 
on a five-point Likert scale, similar to the measurement of the responses to the vignette cases. 
 
<Table 4 about here> 
 
The first item among the perception variables inquiries about the level of crime in the 
local community and in Uganda as a whole. The average score of 2.5 on this item indicates 
that police officers perceive some problems with regard to the overall crime level in the 
country, while, at the same time, they consider the problems to be moderately important. The 
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next aspect we consider refers to the question whether the police treat young people the same 
as old people. The average rating of 4.0 suggests that the majority of the police officers thinks 
that younger people are treated better. In contrast, they do not on average feel that there is a 
big discrepancy in the treatment of poor and rich individuals (average score 3.5). Police 
officers tend to perceive the treatment of men as slightly more favorable compared to the way 
women are treated (score of 3.8).  
Confidence in the police officers’ own work is high as shown by the average score of 
4.6 on the fourth perception component. Police officers’ confidence in the work of their 
fellow officers is also high, albeit 0.2 points lower than confidence in their own performance, 
suggesting that there is some sense of an esprit de corps. When it comes to the role of the 
police, the officers are very clear that it is always their duty to make people obey the law. This 
component obtains the highest overall score at 4.7. Moreover, the great majority of 
interviewed police officers think the police are doing a good job in treating people fairly and 
with respect (average score of 4.1).  
Next we turn to the management of crime: the average score of 4.30 is even 0.2 points 
higher than the average on the fairness and respect question, which suggests that the officers 
have a high opinion about the quality of policing. Here one may see some tension with the 
observation by the Ugandan population that the police are the most corrupt institution in the 
country, which was reported above in section 3. Item 9 of our perception variables addresses 
perceived corruption in the police force. In the light of the self-congratulatory attitude of 
police officers, it is not surprising that officers tend to downplay the seriousness of corruption. 
The statement ‘The police are corrupt’ receives an average score of 2.6, which suggests that, 
despite their positive assessment of the work of the police, officers seem to be moderately 
aware that of problems with corruption in the police force.  
 Taken separately, the ten perception questions provide insight into how individual 
police officers perceive different dimensions of the institutional environment and police 
effectiveness in Uganda. The responses to the questions are interesting in themselves but they 
do not give us a complete picture of the perceived overall level of the institutional 
environment and police effectiveness. For this reason, the next step in the analysis is to 
correlate the ten questions in order to assess to what extent they are related. Results of the 
correlation analysis are presented in table 5.  
 




Visual inspection of the correlation coefficients shows that most of the ten perception 
indicators are highly correlated. The correlations range between -0.353 and 0.571. Most items 
are positively correlated, but the perceived level of crime in the community and the perceived 
level of police corruption show negative correlations with the other variables. The magnitude 
of the pair-wise correlations and the fact that all but one are highly statistically significant, 
leads us to the conclusion that the chosen indicators of the perceived institutional environment 
and police effectiveness are jointly relevant. This result suggests that taken together the 
indicators may be used as a measurement of the self-assessed quality of work of the police.  
On the basis of the results reported in table 5, we include the indicators using two 
approaches. Firstly, we built an index that expresses the average score across all ten items. 
Secondly, we retrieved the first principal component of the variables and use this component 
score as indicator. The bottom two rows of table 4 present the descriptive statistics using the 
two approaches. The average index of the ten perception variables is 3.9 with a standard 
deviation of 0.5. This indicates that the overall perception of police effectiveness borders on 
‘good’ and is thus rather favorable. The average PCA index is 0.0 with a standard deviation of 
1.8. The PCA index shows high variability since it is designed to accumulate maximum 
variability over the ten perception components. It ranges from a minimum of –6.8 to a 
maximum of 2.7. The next section contains a more detailed discussion of the findings of the 
multivariate analysis involving the responses to the questions on the perception of police 
effectiveness and the evaluative questions relating to the vignette cases. 
 
Empirical model 
We set up a multivariate empirical model to analyze the relationship between the evaluative 
questions on police misbehavior and the measures of the perceived institutional environment 
and effectiveness of policing. The following model is used to estimate the evaluative response 
of every police officer i in district d responding to case c:  
 
Yidc = a0 + a1 Effectidc + a2 Socioidc + a3 Workidc + a4 Districtdc + λc +εidc, 
 
where the outcome variable Yidc represents one of the five evaluative responses to the 
vignettes cases. The coefficients of interest are collected in vector a1. These are the 
coefficients associated with the individual components of the perceived institutional 
environment and police effectiveness, denoted as Effectidc. In addition, we include a series of 
control variables: the individual characteristics of the respondents are collected in Socioidc, the 
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work-related characteristics in Workidc and the district characteristics are denoted by 
Districtdc. For the estimation of this model we pool all vignette cases since our primary 
interest is not to assess differences across vignettes but to relate the average rating of the 
vignette responses across cases to the perceived institutional environment and police 
effectiveness. In order to account for the fact that the vignettes display cases of differing 
severity, we control for case specific effects λc, which implies that we include 11 case specific 
effects, leaving one case specific effect as the excluded category. Standard errors εidc are 
clustered at the individual level since the case-specific residual is likely to be correlated 
within officers’ responses.  
 In addition, we estimate a model where we replace the matrix of the ten independent 
perceived institutional environment and police effectiveness measures with a single combined 
index. First we construct the average level of police effectiveness:  Effectidc1 + Effectidc2  + … 
+ Effectidc10)/10. This index, based on the average across the individual items, gives equal 
weight to all its constituting components.  
Second, we use a method that is considered superior and is based on the construction 
of an index using principal component analysis. In principal component analysis we employ 
an orthogonal transformation to convert our ten correlated effectiveness variables by means 
of a statistical procedure into linearly uncorrelated variables called principal components. 
This transformation is based on maximizing the variance in the first principal component, so 
that this first component reflects the internal structure of the police effectiveness variables in a 
way that best explains their variance and contains most of the information across the original 
components. We employ both the average index and the principal component index separately 
to gauge the robustness of the results. The index creation is supported by earlier research, 
which attempted to derive a scale of (seriousness of) police misconduct and indicated that the 
vignettes appear to represent a one- or two-dimensional space (cf. Jenks, 2014: 328; Lee, 
2013: 390).  Based on the existing literature, we opted for the inclusion of only one dimension 
since the average index is one-dimensional and we aimed for a straightforward and direct 
comparison of the results. 
As an additional assessment of the robustness of our results, we estimate the three 
models that were outlined above with district fixed effects instead of including the district 
characteristics. Results of the latter three analyses are presented in Appendix 1 in tables A2 
(for model 1, using detailed perception components) and A3 (for model 2, using the average 






The results of our analyses are presented in tables 6 and 7. Next to the ten perception 
variables (table 6) or the perception indices (table 7), all regression analyses contain the 
above-mentioned individual, work-related, and district-specific control variables as well as 
the vignette fixed effects. These coefficient estimates are not presented for the sake of brevity 
and clarity of exposition.  
We start by assessing the relationship between the evaluative responses to the vignette 
cases and the individual perception components. The results that are summarized in table 6 
show not only that the different evaluative responses capture different aspects of police 
integrity, but also that the perceptions of the institutional environment and police 
effectiveness contain a variety of elements. This implies that across the five evaluative 
responses we find correlations with different aspects of police effectiveness. 
 
<Table 6 about here> 
 
Column 1 of table 6 displays the relationship between the response to the question 
‘How serious do YOU consider this behavior to be?’ and the ten perceived institutional 
environment and police effectiveness components. As can be seen, the perceived severity of 
misbehavior is associated significantly with the perception that the police treat people fairly 
and with the perceived corruption level. The coefficient estimate of 0.150 indicates 
considerable practical relevance: an increase of one standard deviation in the perceived fair 
treatment of people (sd=1.003, see table 4, row 8) explains almost 10% 
(=[0.150*1.003]/1.546*100) of the standard deviation in the perceived severity of the 
misbehavior. Similarly, an increase of one standard deviation in the perceived corruption level 
(sd=1.420, see table 4, row 10), which reflects a decrease in perceived corruption, explains 
6.5% (=[0.071*1.420]/1.546*100) of the standard deviation in the perceived severity of the 
misbehavior. Taken together these two components of perceived police effectiveness explain 
more than 15% of the standard deviation of responses to the evaluative question about won 
seriousness. This is a sizeable effect and suggests that case evaluations are related to two 
aspects of perceived functioning of the police, namely the respectful treatment of people and 
the perceived level of corruption. 
The likelihood that police officers would report the misbehavior of a fellow officer 
shows a statistically significant relationship to the confidence in the work of the colleagues 
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(significant at the 10% level) and to the perceived discrepancy in the treatment of men and 
women (very strongly related and significant at the 1% level). A one standard deviation 
increase in the perceived discrepancy in the treatment of men and women (sd=1.203, see table 
4, row 4) explains 11.6% (=[0.124*1.203]/1.289*100) of the standard deviation of the 
evaluative question about report a fellow police. Similarly 6.3% (=[0.091*0.889]/1.289*100) 
of the standard deviation in reporting is explained by a one standard deviation increase in the 
confidence that police officers have in the work of their colleagues (sd=0.889, see table 4, row 
6). This shows that perceived police effectiveness, in particular related to the perception that 
both sexes are treated differently and the confidence in the performance of colleagues, seems 
to impact on officers’ responses to the question about the reporting of misbehavior. 
When we turn to the police officers’ view of their colleagues and how serious they 
think most police officers in their office consider the depicted misbehavior to be, the outcome 
variable appears to be impacted by three variables of perceived police effectiveness. All are 
linked to the treatment of people. Firstly, the assessment of the seriousness of misbehavior as 
expected from colleagues seems to be associated negatively with the perceived favoring of 
young people. Secondly, colleagues’ assessment of the seriousness appears to be associated 
positively with the perceived favoring of men, while, thirdly, it is associated positively with 
the fair and respectful treatment of people. While only the association with the third variable 
seems strong, we need to gauge the relationship relative to the measurement of the variables 
as presented in the descriptive statistics (table 4). A one standard deviation increase in the first 
and second variable explain 5.7% (=[0.074*1.095]/1.423*100) and 6.6% 
(=[0.078*1.203]/1.423*100) in the standard deviation of the colleagues assessment, 
respectively.  Taken together the three components of perceived police effectiveness explain 
23.6% (=[0.074*1.095+0.078*1.203+0.161*1.003]/1.423*100) of the standard deviation of 
the evaluative question about colleagues’ seriousness. 
The fourth evaluative question deals with the disciplinary measure that should follow 
particular forms of misbehavior. No single component related to the perceptions of the 
institutional environment and police effectiveness appears to have any explanatory power vis-
à-vis the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. 
Finally, we assess whether police officers see the depicted forms of misbehavior as a 
violation of official policy in their agency. This evaluation appears to be correlated with four 
of the perceived institutional environment and police effectiveness components, namely 
confidence in own work, confidence in the work of colleagues, the perception that police 
officers always have the duty to enforce the law, and the perceived corruption level. Except 
  
21 
for the confidence in the work of colleagues, coefficient estimates are statistically significant 
at the 1 or 5% level. Together they explain 27.7% (=[0.088*0.835+0.068*0.889+ 
0.153*0.701+1.42 *0.064]/1.199*100) of the standard deviation in this outcome variable. 
Our findings indicate that overall there is no doubt that the assessment of the vignette 
cases is not only linked to individual, work-related, and police infrastructure variables (which 
are not shown for the sake of brevity), but that the perceived institutional environment and 
police effectiveness variables have additional explanatory power for policy integrity. There is 
no single item that captures the perception of the institutional environment and police 
effectiveness fully, but seven of the ten perception variables seem to play a role in relation to 
different evaluative positions.  
 Linking the five evaluative responses to the vignette cases to the ten individual 
components of the perceived institutional environment and police effectiveness might be 
misleading. We might end up emphasizing only selected dimensions of the perceived 
institutional environment and police effectiveness despite the fact that we have shown in the 
pair-wise correlations that none of these components should be looked at individually since 
the majority are heavily interrelated and only represent different aspects of some larger 
underlying concept. For this reason we now turn to the assessment of the combined indices of 
the perceived institutional environment and police effectiveness. Results of the analyses are 
presented in table 7. All five evaluative responses appear to be correlated positively with both 
effectiveness indices. Our results show that of the five evaluative variables, two are positively 
and statistically significantly correlated with both the average police effectiveness index and 
the PCA index, while two are only statistically significantly correlated with the average index 
and one is only statistically significantly correlated with the PCA index.  
 
<Table 7 about here> 
 
Looking into the analysis of the evaluative responses to the vignette cases one-by-one 
(Table 7), we find that for the assessment of the severity of the case a one standard deviation 
increase in the average index (sd=0.459, see table 4, row 11) explains 6% 
(=[0.203*0.459]/1.546*100) of the standard deviation in the assessed severity of the case. We 
do not find a significant relationship between the PCA index and the severity of the case. 
When it comes to the reporting of a fellow police officer, we find a stronger relationship 
(0.378), which means that a one standard deviation increase in the average index (sd=0.459, 
see table 4, row 11) explains 13% (=[0.378*0.459]/1.289*100) of the standard deviation in 
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the reporting of a fellow officer. We further find a statistically significant relationship with 
the PCA index. A one standard deviation increase in the PCA index (sd=1.820, see table 4, 
row 12) explains roughly 14% (=[0.098*1.820]/1.289*100) of the standard deviation in 
reporting. Thus, while the coefficient estimates differ for the different indices, both indices 
are similar in terms of explanatory power when it comes to the reporting outcome. This result 
stems from the fact that the indices also have different distributions as can be gauged from a 
comparison of the differences of the means and standard deviations. For the evaluative 
question about colleagues’ seriousness we also find that both indices are statistically 
significant. Again they explain similar portions of the standard deviation in that question. The 
average index explains 12% (=[0.371*0.459]/1.423*100), while the PCA index accounts for 
13% (=[0.104*1.820]/1.423*100). With respect to officers’ position on disciplinary measures, 
only the PCA index is significantly related to the evaluative question. The PCA index 
explains about 4% (=[0.031*1.820]/1.514*100) of the standard deviation of the question 
about disciplinary measures. This finding is in line with the analysis of the one-by-one 
analysis of the perceived institutional environment and police effectiveness (table 6). This 
showed that none of the perception variables was individually significant. The final evaluative 
question relates to the official policy in the agency. For this outcome only the average index 
has explanatory power. 
 Despite variations in the associations between police integrity and the presented 
indices, there is no doubt that the two aspects are related yet sensitive to the type of 
measurement and aggregation. By way of conclusion, we argue that different aspects of the 
perceived institutional environment and police effectiveness are related to different evaluative 
dimensions of police integrity. The relationship between the different aspects of police 
integrity and the index of perceived police effectiveness is sensitive to the construction of the 
index demonstrating that a summary index of perceived police effectiveness does not 
necessarily reflect the associations of its constituting components completely. Overall, we 
infer that the subjective perceptions of the institutional environment and police effectiveness 
undoubtedly feed into attitudes of police integrity suggesting that the vignettes can serve as a 
tool to channel and represent the individual subjective biases in a coherent form. 
As indicated above, an additional robustness test is presented in tables A2 and A3 in 
Appendix 1. In the analyses underlying these tables, the district control variables are replaced 
with district fixed effects. The results are almost identical to the findings presented earlier in 
this section, not only in terms of the direction of the effect and its statistical significance, but 
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also in terms of magnitude. These additional tests make us confident about the reliability of 
our results.   
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have attempted to contribute to the burgeoning literature on police 
integrity by assessing what is the relationship between Ugandan police officers’ perceptions 
of the institutional environment and the effectiveness of policing on their evaluations of 
specific forms of police misbehavior. Using data collected in a survey involving 600 police 
officers in Uganda, we focused on 10 perception variables, which we analyzed separately and 
collectively. The results of our analyses show that there are indeed concrete signs that the 
perceived quality of the institutional environment and police effectiveness is impacting on 
evaluative dimensions of police integrity. Our research shows that the perceived quality of the 
institutional environment and perceptions of police effectiveness are impacting the 
evaluations of police misbehavior. The perceptions that are most strongly linked to the 
evaluative questions about police integrity are the assessment of the differential gender 
treatment, police officers’ confidence in the work of colleagues, the view that the police treats 
people fairly and with respect and the perceptions about corruption in the police force.  
While all of these factors relate to several dimensions of police integrity, our results 
also demonstrate that there is not a one-to-one relationship between the assessed dimensions 
of the perceived environmental context and police effectiveness, on the one hand, and the 
evaluations of misbehavior by police officers, on the other. When combining the ten 
dimensions of the perceived institutional environment and police effectiveness in two indices 
(an average index and a principal-component index) and analyzing the relationship with the 
evaluative responses to the vignette cases, we find further evidence that the subjective 
perceptions of the institutional environment and police effectiveness feed into attitudes 
toward police integrity. At the same time, we find that the relationship between the evaluative 
questions about police integrity and the index of perceived police effectiveness is sensitive to 
the construction of the index. Thus, while the vignettes are meant as a tool to reduce 
subjective biases in the evaluation of police misbehavior, the assessment of the vignettes is 
not free of individual perceptions. This suggests that the vignettes can be seen as means to 
channel and represent the individual subjective biases in a coherent and comparable form.  
 We consider the results presented in this chapter only as a first attempt at linking 
police integrity to perceptions about the institutional environment and policing effectiveness. 
In particular, our research is aiming at complementing earlier studies on the impact of various 
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factors on the attitudes of police officers to corruption and misconduct, such as the police’s 
organizational culture and characteristics (Eitle et al., 2014; Kucukuysal, 2008; Kutnjak 
Ivković and Sauerman, 2015), their disciplinary environments (Lee et al., 2013; Kutnjak 
Ivković and Khechumyan, 2014; Cheloukine et al., 2015; Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2016; Kuo, 
2018), disciplinary fairness and organizational justice (Kutnjak Ivković and O’Connor 
Shelley, 2010; Wolfe and Piquero, 2011; Kutnjak Ivković and Sauerman, 2013; Long et al., 
2013; Myhill and Bradford, 2013; Porter et al., 2015), individual and work related 
characteristics (Reynolds and Helfers, 2018; Lee et al., 2013; ) as well as police cynicism 
(Bucak, 2012). 
Our results suggest new avenues for research into the relationship between the 
evaluative positions of police officers and perceptions of institutional environment and 
effectiveness. An obvious first step would be to theorize police effectiveness more 
thoroughly. As suggested by the results obtained in our principal component analysis, there 
appears to be an underlying dimension of police effectiveness in the perception variables (cf. 
table 5). A more systematic review of the literature of public service effectiveness may bring 
out a wider range of indicators, and possibly also dimensions that would be useful in research 
on perceptions of police effectiveness. 
 Another way to enrich the analysis of police effectiveness could be the combination of 
research using vignettes of police integrity with client surveys at the level of police stations of 
units. In such client surveys, individual citizens who had contact with the police (either for 
solving their problems or because they were suspected of crimes or misdemeanors) could be 
asked to provide their assessment of the performance of the police. As a next step, average 
police station or unit level vignette scores could be associated with the perceptions of the 
public. 
 Finally, researchers could attempt to draw on different strands of research, such as for 
instance the studies done by Waddington et al. (2009) on police culture, to get better and more 
nuanced insight into the perceptions of police officers about what is considered to be effective 
policing. Such an approach may possibly build bridges to more detailed psychological 
research to better understand the perceptions of the police. If possible, officers could be 
requested for input at different stages of their career in order to incorporate the impact of 
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Table 1: Grouping of the twelve vignette cases 
Group 1: Code of conduct among the police officers 
   Case 1:  Police mechanic repairing supervisor’s car in exchange for holidays 
   Case 2: Police officer driving drunk and having an accident goes unreported by colleague 
 
Group 2: Bribery 
   Case 3: Acceptance of freely offered meals and small gifts while on duty 
   Case 4: Speeding not reported in exchange for a bribe 
 
Group 3: Theft 
   Case 5: Officer taking money from a lost wallet 
   Case 6: Police officer stealing goods when investigating a burglary 
 
Group 4: Refusal to register complaints 
   Case 7: Refusal to register a complaint and humiliation of the complainant 
   Case 8: Refusal to register a complaint and a one-week detention for the complainant for 
false accusation  
Group 5: Reported severe crimes against individuals not followed up upon 
   Case 9: Police officer refusing to register mistreatment of wife 
   Case 10: Reported murder not being followed up on 
 
Group 6: Undue force used by the police 
   Case 11: Foot patrol torturing a thief 






Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the control variables 
 
  
Mean Std. Dev. 
Panel A: Individual level background characteristics   
   Age 41.785 9.426 
   Gender (Female=1) 0.228 
 
   Marital status (Married=1) 0.843 
 
   Participant is the household head 0.843 
 
   Household size 6.672 3.992 
   Education levels (Excluded category: Primary education) 
  
      Secondary 0.455 
 
      Advanced secondary  0.268 
 
      Higher 0.248 
 
   Income level (Excluded category: Income<200,000UGX) 
  
      Income 200,000-300,000UGX 0.115 
 
      Income 300,000-500,000UGX 0.603 
 
      Income 500,000-700,000UGX 0.140 
 
      Income>700,000UGX 0.095 
 
   # habitable rooms 1.750 1.103 
   # mobile phones owned 1.337 0.578 
   Does sport 0.525 
 
   Member of a club/community organization 0.482 
 
   
Panel B: Work related covariates 
  
   Number of years spent as police officer 18.800 10.556 
   Police rank (Excluded category: Low rank) 
  
      High rank 0.060 
 
      Medium rank 0.322 
 
   Police section (Excluded category: Other sections and duties) 
 
      Traffic 0.043 
 
      Investigation 0.262 
 
      Intelligence 0.063 
 
      General duties 0.463 
 
   # rooms of police station 12.758 9.259 
   # police cars at station 1.522 1.508 
   # police motorcycles at station 6.762 12.557 
   # police bicycles at station 2.147 5.361 
   
Panel C: District-level control variables 
  
   Population size (log) 12.941 0.242 
   Population growth 2.226 0.777 
   Poverty head count rate 22.310 8.539 
   Gini index 0.398 0.073 
   Share of the population belonging to the largest ethnicity 73.980 14.454 
   Police officers per 100,000 inhabitants 133.214 0.090 
   Crime rate 338.232 143.510 
   Homicide rate 8.629 3.910 
Note: The sample consists of 600 police officers. Descriptive statistics of district-level control variables are 





Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the outcome variable 
 
Mean Std. Dev. 
Own seriousness 3.974 1.546 
Own reporting 4.154 1.289 
Colleagues’ seriousness 3.878 1.423 
Disciplinary measure that should follow 3.852 1.514 
Regarded as violation of official policy  4.398 1.199 






Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the perception variables 
 
Mean Std. Dev. 
Perception components 
  
1.   Perceived crime in community 





3.   Similar treatment: Poor vs. rich  3.565 1.296 
4.   Similar treatment: Men vs. women 3.808 1.203 
5.   Confidence in own work 4.582 0.835 
6.   Confidence in work of colleagues 4.428 0.889 
7.   Police: Duty to always enforce the law 4.715 0.701 
8.   Police treats people fairly and with 
respect 
4.090 1.003 
9.   Police manages crime well 4.302 0.842 
10. Police is corrupt 2.560 1.420 
   Average perception index 3.863 0.459 
   PCA perception index 0.000 1.820 
Note: All variables are Likert scaled on a scale from 1 to 5 with 1 representing the category “Definitely not”, 













































 -0.142*** 1 




 -0.134*** 0.463*** 1 




 -0.101** 0.485*** 0.467*** 1 
      
Confidence 
in own work 
 -0.074* 0.226*** 0.159*** 0.186*** 1 
     
Confidence 
in work of 
colleagues 
 -0.130*** 0.259*** 0.317*** 0.305*** 0.404*** 1 




 -0.010** 0.140*** 0.099** 0.189*** 0.170*** 0.325*** 1 
   
Police treat 
people fairly 









0.149***  -0.176***  -0.353***  -0.252*** -0.049  -0.231***  -0.170***  -0.221***  -0.218*** 1 





Table 6: Results with detailed perception components 














      
1. Perceived crime in community 0.023 -0.036 -0.013 -0.014 -0.040 
 (0.034) (0.022) (0.030) (0.025) (0.029) 
2. Similar treatment: Young vs. old  -0.069 0.043 -0.074** 0.003 0.016 
 
  
(0.046) (0.032) (0.036) (0.031) (0.026) 
3. Similar treatment: Poor vs. rich  -0.011 0.032 0.055 -0.005 -0.012 
 
  
(0.044) (0.027) (0.037) (0.030) (0.026) 
4. Similar treatment: Men vs. women 0.054 0.124*** 0.078** -0.011 -0.010 
 
  
(0.041) (0.038) (0.037) (0.029) (0.026) 
5. Confidence in own work 0.085 -0.002 0.042 0.027 0.088** 
 
  
(0.058) (0.036) (0.048) (0.039) (0.042) 
6. Confidence in work of colleagues 0.005 0.091* -0.014 0.023 0.068* 
 
  
(0.057) (0.053) (0.046) (0.040) (0.036) 
7. Police: Duty to always enforce the law 0.043 0.039 0.074 0.019 0.153*** 
 
  
(0.062) (0.035) (0.059) (0.056) (0.054) 
8. Police treats people fairly and with respect 0.150*** 0.034 0.161*** 0.061 -0.054 
 
  
(0.055) (0.022) (0.050) (0.040) (0.037) 
9. Police manages crime well -0.054 0.021 -0.010 -0.023 0.008 
 
  
(0.058) (0.030) (0.052) (0.045) (0.043) 
10. Police is corrupt 
 
0.071** 0.031 0.006 -0.012 0.064*** 
 
  
(0.031) (0.040) (0.027) (0.023) (0.025) 
Note: OLS regression results. The regressions are based on 600 individuals and their responses to 12 cases resulting in 7,200 observations. All regressions include case specific effects (not 
shown). Individual level socio-economic characteristics that are controlled for but coefficients are not shown: age, gender, marital status, whether the respondent is household head, education 
level (dummies for secondary, advanced secondary and higher education, excluded category: primary education), household size, income level (dummies), number of habitable rooms in the 
house, number of mobile phones owned, whether the person does sports and whether the person is a member of a community organization. Work related characteristics that are controlled for but 
coefficients are not shown: Years of service, rank (high rank and medium rank, low rank forms the excluded category), number of rooms of the police station, number of police cars, number of 
police motorcycles, number of police bicycles, Police section (traffic, investigation, intelligence, general duties, excluded category: Other sections and duties). District-level characteristics that 
are controlled for but coefficients are not shown: Population size (log), population growth, rate of police officers, crime rate, homicide rate, poverty head count, Gini coefficient, share of the 
population belonging to the main ethnicity of the district. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual respondent.
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Table 7: Results employing a perception index 
 




that should follow 
Regarded as violation 
of official policy 
 














































Note: Compare note to table 6 for detailed information about the employed empirical specifications.
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Appendix 1. Supplementary tables 
Table A1: Detailed descriptive statistics of the vignette cases 
 
Own seriousness Own reporting 
Colleagues’ 
seriousness 
Disciplinary measure that 
should follow 
Regarded as violation of 
official policy 
Group 1: Code of conduct among the police officers 
  Case 1: Police mechanic repairing supervisor’s car in exchange for holidays 
     Mean 3.720 4.058 3.693 3.803 4.243 
     Std. Dev. 1.566 1.305 1.422 1.348 1.303 
Case 2: Police officer driving drunk and having an accident goes unreported by colleague 
     Overall mean 3.710 3.918 3.597 3.645 4.107 
     Std. Dev. 1.585 1.397 1.463 1.459 1.371 
Group 2: Bribery 
 Case 3: Acceptance of freely offered meals and small gifts while on duty 
     Overall mean 3.533 3.165 3.445 3.150 3.955 
     Std. Dev. 1.534 1.552 1.500 1.399 1.488 
Case 4: Speeding not reported in exchange for a bribe 
      Mean 4.367 4.253 3.920 4.313 4.542 
     Std. Dev. 1.279 1.164 1.424 1.263 1.093 
Group 3: Theft   
Case 5: Officer taking money from a lost wallet 
       Mean 4.042 4.272 3.795 4.110 4.433 
     Std. Dev. 1.537 1.248 1.454 1.428 1.154 
Case 6: Police officer stealing goods when investigating a burglary 
     Mean 4.472 4.603 4.327 5.068 4.643 
     Std. Dev. 1.228 0.913 1.188 1.205 0.965 
 
 
Table A1: Cont. 
 
Own seriousness Own reporting 
Colleagues’ 
seriousness 
Disciplinary measure that 
should follow 
Regarded as violation of 
official policy 
Group 4: Refusal to register complaints 
  Case 7: Refusal to register a complaint and humiliation of the complainant 
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     Mean 3.622 4.033 3.542 3.478 4.313 
     Std. Dev. 1.663 1.232 1.476 1.300 1.235 
Case 8: Refusal to register a complaint and a one-week detention for the complainant for false accusation 
     Mean 4.010 4.473 3.970 4.122 4.563 
     Std. Dev. 1.593 1.043 1.424 1.239 1.059 
Group 5: Reported severe crimes against individuals not followed up upon 
Case 9: Police officer refusing to register mistreatment of wife 
      Mean 4.275 4.472 4.125 4.012 4.592 
     Std. Dev. 1.425 1.020 1.284 1.280 0.976 
Case 10: Reported murder not being followed up on 
       Mean 3.922 4.467 4.100 2.728 4.530 
     Std. Dev. 1.630 0.997 1.324 1.204 1.059 
Group 6: Undue force used by the police 
  Case 11: Foot patrol torturing a thief 
        Mean 3.895 4.077 3.783 3.875 4.352 
     Std. Dev. 1.565 1.303 1.427 1.391 1.233 
Case 12: Brutal strike down of a demonstration 
       Mean 4.117 4.053 4.235 3.923 4.508 
     Std. Dev. 1.578 1.490 1.354 2.125 1.147 



















    
1. Perceived crime in community 0.024 -0.036 -0.013 -0.015 -0.040 
 (0.034) (0.022) (0.030) (0.025) (0.029) 
2. Similar treatment: Young vs. old  -0.067 0.045 -0.077** -0.001 0.020 
 
(0.046) (0.032) (0.037) (0.031) (0.026) 
3. Similar treatment: Poor vs. rich  -0.012 0.031 0.056 -0.003 -0.014 
 
(0.044) (0.027) (0.037) (0.029) (0.025) 
4. Similar treatment: Men vs. women 0.056 0.122*** 0.076** -0.014 -0.006 
 
(0.041) (0.039) (0.037) (0.029) (0.026) 
5. Confidence in own work 0.082 -0.004 0.045 0.031 0.084** 
 
(0.057) (0.037) (0.049) (0.039) (0.041) 
6. Confidence in work of colleagues 0.003 0.093* -0.013 0.025 0.065* 
 
(0.057) (0.053) (0.046) (0.041) (0.036) 
7. Police: Duty to always enforce the law 0.046 0.038 0.071 0.015 0.157*** 
 
(0.062) (0.035) (0.060) (0.055) (0.054) 
8. Police treat people fairly and with respect 0.149*** 0.035 0.162*** 0.062 -0.055 
 
(0.055) (0.022) (0.050) (0.040) (0.036) 
9. Police manage crime well -0.058 0.023 -0.006 -0.017 0.002 
 
(0.058) (0.030) (0.052) (0.045) (0.043) 
10. Police are corrupt 0.072** 0.028 0.004 -0.015 0.067*** 
 
(0.031) (0.041) (0.027) (0.023) (0.024) 
Note: The regressions are based on 600 individuals and their responses to 12 cases resulting in 7,200 observations. All regressions include case specific and district specific effects (not shown). 
Individual level socio-economic characteristics that are controlled for but coefficients are not shown: age, gender, marital status, whether the respondent is household head, education level 
(dummies for secondary, advanced secondary and higher education, excluded category: primary education), household size, income level (dummies), number of habitable rooms in the house, 
number of mobile phones owned, whether the person does sports and whether the person is a member of a community organization. Work related characteristics that are controlled for but 
coefficients are not shown: Years of service, rank (high rank and medium rank, low rank forms the excluded category), number of rooms of the police station, number of police cars, number of 
police motorcycles, number of police bicycles, Police section (traffic, investigation, intelligence, general duties, excluded category: Other sections and duties). Standard errors are clustered at the 




Table A3: Results employing a perception index 
 




that should follow 
Regarded as violation 
of official policy 
 
Average PCA Average PCA Average PCA Average PCA Average PCA 











































Note: Compare note to table 5 for detailed information about the employed empirical specifications.
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Appendix 2. The 12 vignette cases 
 
Group 1: Code of conduct among the police officers 
Case 1: A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to work 
during coming holidays. The supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to 
repair her/his personal car. Evaluate the supervisor’s behavior. 
 
Case 2: At 2:00 a.m., a police officer, who is on duty, is driving her/his patrol car on a 
deserted road. S/he sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. 
S/he approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously drunk. 
S/he also finds that the driver is a police officer. S/he transports the driver home. Evaluate the 
behavior of the police officer on duty. 
 
 
Group 2: Bribery  
Case 3: A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small 
value from merchants on his duty. S/he does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse 
the generosity of those who give gifts to her/him. 
 
Case 4: A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal 
gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not taking the offending motorist to court 
to answer to charges for the traffic offence. 
 
 
Group 3: Theft 
Case 5: A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot. It contains an amount of money 
equivalent to a full day’s pay for that officer. S/he reports the wallet as lost property but keeps 
the money for her/himself. 
 
Case 6: A police officer discovers a burglary of a general merchandise shop. The display 
cases are smashed, and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the 
shop, s/he takes 10 jerricans of cooking oil and 1 sack of posho of 100 kilograms worth about 
a month’s pay for that officer. S/he reports that the items had been stolen during the burglary. 
 
 
Group 4: Refusal to register complaints 
Case 7: A formerly arrested man comes to the police station and wants to fill in a complaint 
form. He claims that he was not treated properly during his arrest. The police officer who is in 
charge laughs at him and sends him away. 
 
Case 8: A men goes to a police station to register a complaint over one of their officers who 
had beaten and tortured him. At the station he finds a friend of the officer who tortured him. 
The friend refuses to register his complaint and instead decides to detain him for a weak over 





Group 5: Reported severe crimes against individuals not followed up upon 
Case 9: A women goes to the police station to report a case where her husband has been 
beating her for the last one year. She lost one of her teeth and has a damaged eye due to the 
beating. The police officer on duty thinks this is a mere family dispute and not a crime for the 
police to handle. S/he refuses to register the case. 
 
Case 10: A police officer on duty receives a woman who wants to register a case of murder of 
her child by a neighbor. The officer registers the case and promises to follow up and arrest the 
suspect in a few hours’ time. Two days down the road, the suspect has not been arrested and 
was sending messages threatening to harm the complainant. The woman went back to the 
same police station to report the scenario and the suspect was arrested and detained at the 
police station. However, the suspect was released immediately on account that there was not 





Group 6: Undue force used by the police 
Case 11: Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into a 
shop. The man flees. They chase him for about ½ a kilometer before apprehending him by 
tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control, both officers punch 
him a couple of times in the stomach and step on his back several times as punishment for 
fleeing and resisting. 
 
Case 12: A sub-district has a challenge of water shortage for a period of four months. The 
area leader together with residents decide to petition national water for the poor services and 
failure to deliver. However, the situation continues for two more months. The area leader and 
the residents opt to stage a peaceful demonstration as a way of showing their dissatisfaction. 
No sooner had the demonstration started than the District Police Commander deployed a team 
of officers with teargas and firing of live ammunitions killing 20 of the demonstrators 
including the area leader. Evaluate the District Police Commander’s behavior. 
 
 
